

Computer Science, College of William and Mary

IMDGuard

Securing Implantable Medical Devices with the External Wearable Guardian

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
 - Security Problem
 - New Infrastructure
 - Challenges
- 2 Methodology
 - Adversary Model
 - Description
 - Implementation
- 3 Evaluation
- 4 Conclusion





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
Trend of Modern IMDs

- **Multifarious function.** It has been integrated into many IMDs that the flexible therapy configuration, physical condition monitoring, and diagnostic data stage.
- **Wireless capability.** It is common to find out current IMDs shipped with wireless communication interface. The frequency band used by IMDs has been approved by U.S. Federal Communications Commission and European Telecommunications Standards Institute.
- **Large demands.** 25 million US citizens depend upon IMDs, reported in 2001. This demand is expected to continue increasing 8.3 percent annually through 2014.





Current Communication Model





Potential Attacks

All wireless interactions occurred daily on patients' IMDs currently are not protected, which can be leveraged by vandals.

A recent study demonstrated that, by using equipments available on the markets, an IMD is able to be reprogrammed, putting the patient's life in danger.





Motivation

renewing key requires previous authorized keys

accessible only to authorized identities(keys)

tension between security and safety

malfunctioning

key lost or damaged

unauthorized access in emergency





Motivation

renewing key requires previous authorized keys

How to design a security scheme for IMDs that protects IMDs in regular situations, but safely allow access in any emergency without assistance from the patient?

multifun


identities(keys)

key lost or damaged

unauthorized access in emergency



New Infrastructure



Programmer


authorized

unauthorized

unauthorized in emergency



New Infrastructure



IMD



Programmer


Guardian

authorized
 unauthorized
 unauthorized in emergency





New Infrastructure



Guardian




authorized
 unauthorized
 unauthorized in emergency







New Infrastructure



First Challenge



Second Challenge





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Adversary Model

- Consider an adversary whose goal is trying to program to or retrieve data from the IMD without being caught.
- Assume the adversary cannot physically measure the patient's real-time ECG signals without being detected.
- Assume there is no adversary in an emergency situation.






Overview


- IMDGuard is a novel security scheme for IMD-Guardian-Programmer infrastructure.
- IMDGuard incorporates two techniques tailored to provide desirable protections for IMDs.
 - 1 ECG-based secure key extraction.** It allows the IMD securely pairs to an legitimate Guardian without any prior shared secrets.
 - 2 Spoofing-resistant access control.** It provides security to the IMD in normal cases, and only grants accessibility to any programmer in *real emergency*.



Secure Key Establishment Scheme Based on ECG Signals



ECG Delineation IPI fluctuation



i quantization

ii reconciliation

00101010101
01010100101
00110101101
10101011011

Secret Key






Secure Key Establishment Scheme Based on ECG Signals

Quantization:

- We map each IPI fluctuation into a n -bit binary string.
- Occurrences of different n -bit binary string mappings are equally likely.
- In order to reduce the mismatched bits of two sides, we pick proper n and apply gray code.



ECG Delineation IPI fluctuation

01010101
10100101
10101101
01011011

Secret Key





Secure Key Establishment Scheme Based on ECG Signals


Quantization:

Reconciliation:

- Exchange a bit information so that both sides can agree on a secret composed of identical binary strings.
- Remove the leaked information to condense the entropy of generated secret.

code.

01010101
10100101
10101101
01011011



ECG Delineation IPI fluctuation

Secret Key





Secure Key Establishment Scheme Based on ECG Signals

Quantization:


Reconciliation:

Features:

- No need to change IMDs' hardware design.
 - Ensured information-theoretic security.
 - Robust against man-in-the-middle attacks.
- the entropy of generated secret.

code.

01010101
10100101
10101101
01011011



ECG Delineation IPI fluctuation

Secret Key



Spoofing-resistant Access Control

Motivation


- It is unknown how powerful the adversary is.
- Collaboration is possible between the IMD and Guardian.

Strategy


Guardian jams IMD's message to block illegal interactions when encountering spoofing attacks.



When There is no Spoofing Attacks



Defensive Jamming against Spoofing Attacks





Prototype Implementation



Total code size of IMDGuard prototype		
Module	ROM(<i>bytes</i>)	RAM (<i>bytes</i>)
IMD	20656	1056
Programmer	20754	1060
Guardian	20614	1050
ECC	42190	1931
Key Extraction	10078	887
ECG Delineation	18720	9652





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
Key Establishment

- 1 Variance.** The historic records of the same person do not help adversary to guess the generated key, neither do that of other people.
- 2 Efficiency.** On average a secret key can be extracted in 45 seconds.
- 3 Randomness.** Generated keys can pass National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Randomness testing suite.



Access Control Protocol

Defensive Jamming Effectiveness



Prototype Timing Information

Overhead in Time (ms)		
Situation	Operation	Overhead
Authentication	Signing(20bytes)	1550
	Verification(20bytes)	2221
	Others	50
Guardian Removed	Challenge Transfer	512
	Others	14
Guardian Jamming	Session Deny	1501





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Conclusion

- 1** We are the first to propose a rigorously information-theoretic secure extraction scheme, and evaluate its performance on resource constrained embedded systems.
- 2** We are the first to finalize and implement a comprehensive secure protocol for the IMD-Guardian-Programmer infrastructure.
- 3** We perform extensive experiments on our prototype to evaluate the validity and performance of IMDGuard.



Thank You

Any question

